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We develop a powerful and user-friendly program for numerically solving ﬁrst price
auction problems where an arbitrary number of bidders draw independent valuations from
heterogenous distributions and the auctioneer imposes a reserve price for the object. The
heterogeneity in this model arises both from the speciﬁcation of ex-ante heterogenous,
non-uniformdistributionsofprivatevaluesforbidders, aswellasthepossibilityofsubsets
of these bidders colluding. The technique extends the work of Marshall, Meurer, Richard,
and Stromquist (1994), where they applied backward recursive Taylor series expansion
techniques to solve two-player asymmetric ﬁrst price auctions under uniform distribu-
tions. The algorithm is also used to numerically investigate whether revenue equivalence
between ﬁrst price and second price auctions in symmetric models extend to the asym-
metric case. In particular, we simulate the model under various environments and ﬁnd
evidence that under the assumption of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, the ﬁrst price
auction generates higher expected revenue to the seller, while the second price auction
is more susceptible to collusive activities. However, when the assumption of ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance is relaxed, and the distributions of private values cross once, the ev-
idence suggests that the second price auction may in some cases generate higher expected
revenue to the seller.
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In this paper, we develop a powerful and computationally tractable algorithm for numerically
solving ﬁrst price single object auction problems where bidders draw independent and private
values from heterogenous distributions, groups of symmetric bidders collude, and the auction-
eer imposes a reserve price for the object. The algorithm is then implemented in a simulation
exercise to investigate revenue (non-) equivalence between the ﬁrst and second price sealed
bid auctions in this asymmetric environment. We also investigate the stability of collusive be-
havior among bidders. Thus, this study contributes to three broad but not unrelated branches
in auction theory. We thus discuss the literature and open issues on these areas.
There is a large body of work in auction theory that assumes symmetry in the beliefs of
bidders regarding the value of the object being sold. The typical environment studied is one in
which buyers have common underlying preferences and draw their signals from a symmetric
uniform probability distribution (see Maskin and Riley (1984), Mathews (1983), Milgrom and
Weber (1982a), and Riley and Samuelson (1981) for key contributions in this line of research).
The structure of the symmetric auction model is attractive to theorists because in most cases,
bid functions and expected revenues can be obtained analytically. It is widely known however
that the assumption of bidder symmetry is restrictive and in many cases unrealistic in most
applications. In practice, there are usually compelling reasons to think that bidders are ex-
ante asymmetric, in that their beliefs may be drawn from heterogenous distributions of private
values.
Relaxing the assumption of bidder symmetry typically renders the computation of equi-
librium bids analytically intractable. This unfortunate fact has inhibited revenue comparison
since expected revenue calculations for the asymmetric case typically require knowledge of
the bid functions. However, contributions of Lebrun (1991, 1996, 1999) and Maskin and Riley
(2000a,b) relax the assumption of bidder symmetry and establish existence and uniqueness of
the equilibrium at a ﬁrst price auction when bidders draw independent and private valuations
from heterogenous distributions. Capitalizing on this progress, Maskin and Riley (2000a) pro-
vide some comparison of the seller revenue and bidders bidding patterns under the assumption
of bidder asymmetry. In particular, they assume that the distribution of private values for one
bidder ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the distribution of the other bidder. Under this as-
sumption, they are able to show that the high bid auction dominates the open auction in terms
of seller revenue, and that the stronger bidder (the bidder with the ﬁrst order stochastically
dominant distribution of valuations) shades his bid further below his valuation than the weak
bidder. Maskin and Riley (2000a) also showed that under different characterizations on the
distributions (where one of the bidder’s distribution of private values has a probability mass
at the lower end point), the revenue to the seller may be higher in open auctions, than in high
bid auctions. An important contribution in this area was made by Marshall, Meurer, Richard,
and Stromquist (1994) (MMRS hereafter) where they developed a numerical algorithm for
computing the equilibrium bid functions for the asymmetric ﬁrst price sealed bid auction.
A common feature of these models is that they all assume that heterogeneity in distri-
butions are restricted to two types (a weak type and a strong type). Furthermore, speciﬁc
calculations rely heavily on the assumption that individual valuations are drawn from uniform
distributions. First order stochastic dominance is either an artifact of the distributions used in
1these models (MMRS) or it is explicitly assumed (Maskin and Riley (2000a)). The algorithm
developed in this paper allows for richer form of heterogeneity than the two type case. Indeed,
the algorithm allows for there to be as many types as there are bidders. Furthermore, the al-
gorithm is not restricted to the assumption of type being drawn from uniform distributions. In
fact, the algorithm can be implemented under the assumption of the investigator’s preferred
distribution function for types, as long as the function is (at least numerically) invertible. No
speciﬁc ordering of the distributions of private values is necessary for implementation of the
algorithm. The ability to relax the assumption of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance with this al-
gorithm turns out to be important as we ﬁnd that results from revenue comparisons under the
assumption of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance may not necessary carry over to cases where
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance no longer hold.
The study of MMRS was also important in that it demonstrated the potential for numer-
ical analysis to contribute signiﬁcantly to the advancement of theoretical auction. Their key
interest was to study the viability of bidding rings in asymmetric ﬁrst and second price auc-
tions. They found (numerical) evidence to support the conjecture that collusive agreements
are easier to reach in second price auctions than in ﬁrst price auctions. This result holds under
the assumption that all bidders are endowed with the same uniform distribution for beliefs, and
a subset of these bidders form a coalition and bid against the other symmetric individual bid-
ders. The algorithm developed in this paper is ﬂexible enough to study the case where a set of
distributionally homogenous bidders form a coalition and bid against potentially heterogenous
individual bidders. The restriction that the coalition can only be formed by distributionally ho-
mogenous bidders can be relaxed with some work. However, in reality, the evidence suggests
that this is likely to be the case. For example, in antique auctions, experts are empirically more
likely to collude for reasons of keeping information private.
The algorithm developed in this paper draws on the principle developed in MMRS. In
particular, we compute approximate solutions to the system of ordinary differential equations
(ODE) that characterize the ﬁrst order conditions for the existence of an asymmetric Nash
equilibrium by applying a recursive piecewise low order Taylor series expansions technique.
Similar to MMRS, the solution belongs to a class of “two-point boundary value problems”,
but they suffer from problems caused by a singularity of the system at the origin. This singu-
larity eliminates the option of forward extrapolation procedures as the solution will not satisfy
endpoint boundary conditions. It also complicates backward shooting procedures because the
recursion becomes unstable in a neighborhood of the origin.
The variety of distributions that the algorithm allows for introduces two key additional
difﬁculties. The ﬁrst is that strong curvature in the distribution of private values result in
strong (ampliﬁed) curvature in the key auxiliary function used in the solution of the system.
This strong curvature makes Taylor series approximations less precise, but the major difﬁculty
is that the system may shoot too fast to the “x-axis”, which generates a different form of
singularity of the system. The problems could possibly be avoided by implementing smarter
routines that adjust the step size in these regions. However, with the complexity of the solution
methoditself, weoptforsimplermethodssothatattentionisfocusedonthekeyactualsolution
methodology. Also, it is very cheap to reﬁne the grid on which the routine “steps”, thus
reducing the signiﬁcance of these pathologies. Second, the algorithm requires that the density
of distribution of private values be sufﬁciently bounded away from zero on its support. In fact,
2this problem did not appear in MMRS since the density of the uniform distribution is trivially
bounded away from zero on its support. Despite these pathologies, in practice the algorithm
turns out to be remarkably stable. Indeed, once the condition that the density be sufﬁciently
bounded away from zero is respected by the user, our experience is that the algorithm always
produces stable and precise bid functions, even with quite extreme curvature of the distribution
of private values.
MarshallandSchulenberg(1998)extendedthenumericalalgorithmofMMRStoaccom-
modate reserve prices set by the auctioneer. Their numerical analysis provides evidence that
once optimal reserve price is introduced, second price auctions dominate ﬁrst price auctions
in terms of expected revenue of the seller. Again, these algorithms are written for uniform
private value distributions and can only analyze the case of two types of bidders, the coalition
on one hand and the fringe of symmetric individual bidders on the other, or in the case of
coalition versus coalition. In summary, to further enrich the scope of investigation of indepen-
dent asymmetric ﬁrst price auction framework, we propose a solution algorithm much in the
spirit of MMRS. This algorithm allows for (1) ex-ante heterogeneity in the distribution of pri-
vate values for bidders, (2) heterogeneity that results from a (homogenous) subset of bidders
engaging in collusive activities, (3) non-uniform distribution of private values, (4) arbitrary
number of types of bidders, and (5) reserve prices to be set by the auctioneer.
In Section 2 we present the model. The model is solved in section 3. Section 4 presents
samples of the numerical results for the case where private values are of distributed exponen-
tial. Section 5 offers a brief discussion.
2 The Model
We describe the environment of concern in which a single object is sold in a ﬁrst price auction.
Speciﬁcally, bidders simultaneously submit sealed bids for a single object where the highest
bidder wins and pays his bid price. The group of potential bidders comprises of n risk neutral
individuals. Each of the n individuals belong to one of r types, where each type i (i=1,    ,r)
draw their valuations independently from a distribution F⋆
i ( ) on [vi, ¯ vi].
Consider an arbitrary type i from the set of r types. This group of individuals is divided
into ki coalitions of size ui each. Thus the number of type i individuals is given by kiui and
the total number of participants is given by n = å
r
i=1kiui. We assume that each coalition acts
as one bidder who draws a valuation from the cumulative Fi = [F⋆
i ( )]ui. Hence we have K =
å
r
i=1ki possible bidders. Without loss of generality, we call each possible bidder a coalition.
For example, consider the auction consisting of n = 10 individuals grouped in r = 3 types.
There are 4 individuals of type 1, 3 of type 2 and 3 of type 3. The 4 individuals of type 1
decide to form 2 coalitions of size 2 each. Thus k1 = 2 and u1 = 2. All 3 individuals of
type 2 collude, thus we have k2 = 1 and u2 = 3. Finally, the players of type 3 decide to play
individually, thus making k3 = 3 and u3 = 1. This setup is sufﬁciently ﬂexible to describe and
study a very large variety of auction environments.
Bid functions are denoted by the Greek letter fi, i = 1,    ,r. Bidders are assumed to be
risk neutral with utility from winning the auction with a bid b given a type vi deﬁned asUi(vi−
3b) = vi−b. Clearly, utility from winning the auction is increasing in the individual’s signal.
Under these assumptions, proposition 5 of Maskin and Riley (2000b) establishes the existence
of a monotonic pure-strategy equilibrium in the standard ﬁrst price auction. Indeed, Lebrun
(1996) has shown that these bid functions are strictly monotone and increasing, therefore,
invertible. Inverse bid functions are denoted by the Greek letter li, i = 1,    ,r. Uniqueness
of such equilibrium is well established in the case with two types (Lebrun (1996)). However
in the general n player game, equilibrium may not be unique in that we may end up with
”non-essential” equilibria (Briesmer et al. (1967)).
In this paper, we assume that the distributions of private values have common support,
that is vi = v and ¯ vi = ¯ v for all i. We also assume that Fi is twice continuously differentiable,
with ﬁrst derivative (the corresponding pdf) bounded away from zero on [v, ¯ v]. Under these
assumptions, Lebrun (1999) proves in the general n bidder case that the equilibrium is unique,
and that the inverse bid functions have a common support [v,t⋆], where t⋆ is the bid associated
with the valuation ¯ v, and v is the reserve price set by the auctioneer. We show in this paper that
this equilibrium is amenable to numerical analysis, and presents itself as a natural extension
to the methods proposed in MMRS. As such the (numerical) determination of t⋆ is a critical
component of the problem to be solved.
3 Model Solution
3.1 The Differential Equations
Let t = fi(v) denote the Nash equilibrium bid submitted by coalition i when its highest valua-
tion is v. Hence t is given by
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The initial conditions are
li(v) = v, i = 1,    ,K, (3.4)
4and the terminal conditions require the existence of a number t⋆ ∈ [v, ¯ v] such that
li(t⋆) = ¯ v, i = 1,    ,K. (3.5)
3.2 Numerical Solution
Deﬁne li(t) = Fi(li(t)). Differentiating gives l′
i(t) = fi(li(t))l′















], i = 1,    ,K. (3.6)
This transformation of the system of equations reduces the dimension of the problem, and
makes it far more tractable than otherwise. The initial and terminal conditions for these new
functions are:
li(v) = 0, i = 1,    ,K, (3.7)
li(¯ v) = 1, i = 1,    ,K. (3.8)
Let l0















Successive derivations reveal that all higher order derivatives of li are 0 at v. It follows that
any attempt to evaluate numerically a forward solution of the ﬁrst order differential equations
(3.6) produces a linear solution. This problem is a manifestation of that found by MMRS. We
thus follow their recommendation and solve the system of equations (3.6) backward starting
from an assumed terminal point using the initial condition (3.4) as an indicator of whether or
not we have used the correct value of t⋆.
The solution technique proceeds by approximating the l’s by piecewise(low-order) poly-
nomial expansions. For notational convenience, we switch to matrix representation of the ﬁrst
order differential equations (3.3). The matrix representation also convenient for implementa-



























































j=0(j+1)aj+1(t−to)j, we can represent the equality l′(t)=(l′(t)/l(t))×


































, i = 1,    ,r (3.14)
There are two key recursive formulas that constitute our numerical solution. Equation (3.14)






pij(t −to)j, i = 1,    ,r (3.15)
Toevaluate(3.15), weimplement anefﬁcient recursivechain rule forsuchTaylorseriesexpan-
sions developed in appendix C of MMRS. Speciﬁcally, the routine takes as inputs the Taylor
series approximation of li(t) and (user supplied) Taylor series expansion of F−1
i (x) and returns
as output the approximation of F−1
i (li(t)). One signiﬁcant advantage of this routine is that for
complicated functions, one can break the function in to smaller, more manageable components
that are easier to approximate by Taylor series expansion, and then use the routine to compose
these different parts and recover a Taylor series approximation of the function.
Clearly, the algorithm requires that the inverse function F−1
i (x) is deﬁned and well be-
haved. If there exists a point (v) on the support of the distribution function Fi such that
fi(v) = 0, then the second term in the Taylor series expansion of F−1
i (Fi(v)) will be unde-
ﬁned. Thus the algorithm requires that fi(v) > 0 for all v in the interval [v, ¯ v].




























































(t −to)j, i = 1,    ,r
This system of equations can be used to recursively evaluate the values of a. To see this, note




(k1−1)p10 k2p10     krp10
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. . . ...
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Inspection of the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equations (3.17) and (3.18) reveal that
partition inverse techniques in matrix algebra can be applied to get a closed form inverse of
this matrix. Thus this equation can be efﬁciently solved for recursively for aj, j ≥ 1. For ease
of notation, write equations (3.17) and (3.18) as AaJ+1 = BJ, where BJ is 1 for J = 0, and a
function of (a0,    ,aJ) for J ≥ 1. Then aJ+1 can be calculated as
aJ+1 = A−1BJ. (3.19)
Equation (3.19) is the second recursive formula that makes up our numerical solution to the
system of differential equations deﬁned in equation (3.6).
3.3 The Algorithm
A single run of computation requires initializing certain parameters, evaluating the corre-
sponding numerical solution, and then deciding upon whether or not another run is needed.
71. Initialization. The parameters to be initialized are below.
(i) t⋆: Unlike in MMRS, ﬁnding reﬁned interval in which t⋆ belongs is not possible in
our model. It is clear however, that t⋆ ∈ (v, ¯ v)
(ii) N: The number of equal length intervals of (v,t⋆) to be considered.
(iii) J: The order of the Taylor series expansions.
(iv) e: A small positive number to be used in evaluation of our convergence criterion.
2. Numerical Evaluation. Approximate values of li(tj−1) are computed recursively by
means of Taylor series expansions or order J around ts, for s running backward from
s = N +1 to s = 1. At any step s, the process of the Taylor series expansion can be
described as two steps
(i) Set a0 = lts. Calculate the Taylor series expansion of F−1(l(ts)) and compute p0.
With these quantities in hand, the matrix A in equation (3.17) can be computed.
From these initializations, we can calculate a0 from equation (3.19). Given a0
and a0, a1 is calculated from equation (3.14).
(ii) At step j ≥ 1 of the Taylor series expansion, use the expansion of F−1(l(ts)) as
well as aj to compute pj. Then use (p0,    ,pj) and (a0,    ,aj) to compute Bj in
equation (3.18). With these, aj+1 can be computed from equation (3.19), and then
aj+1 can be computed from equation (3.14). We then use our vector of coefﬁcients
(a0,    ,aJ) to compute l(ts−1), and repeat step (i) for s = s−1.
3. Convergence Criteria. MMRS presents in their Appendix B a robust stopping criteria
for their algorithm. However due to the high level on nonlinearity in our model, these
stopping criteria prove to be unsatisfactory. The main reason for this is that for some
distributions, l0
i will be highly nonlinear, and may shoot rapidly to zero. We thus adopt
the stopping criteria that is implied by the initial conditions (3.7). This criteria provides







By construction, this objective function has a unique minimum at ˆ li(v;t⋆) = v. We em-
ploy the simplex search algorithm AMOEBA to ﬁnd this minimum. The stopping rule is
to stop if the improvement in the objective function is less that e. If (3.20) is minimized,
then the corresponding sequence of ˆ li(to)’s constitute our (approximate) numerical so-
lution.
4 Some Examples
The solution methodology and algorithm developed in 2 allow for the analysis of a large
variety of auction environments. As an illustration, we select an arbitrary auction environment
andstudythecorrespondingbidfunctionsthatresultfromourcomputations. Thebidfunctions
8are computed for an auction with n = 5 initial participants grouped into three types (r = 3).
The distribution of private values belong to the standard two parameter Weibull family:







, i = 1,    ,r. (4.1)
The Weibull distribution is an appealing choice for private values in this example because of
the ﬂexibility of the distribution with respect to its parameters. Speciﬁcally, if the shape pa-
rameter is less than or equal to 1, the shape of the corresponding pdf is everywhere decreasing.
However, for the values of the shape parameter greater than 1, the shape of the corresponding
pdf becomes unimodal. The reservation price is chosen to be v = 1.0 and the upper trun-
cation point of the distribution is chosen to be ¯ v = 4.0. The actual distribution used in the
computation is therefore given by:
Fi(v) =
  ˜ Fi(v)− ˜ Fi(v)
˜ Fi(¯ v)− ˜ Fi(v)
 ui
i = 1,    ,r, (4.2)
where, ui is the number of individuals in coalition i. Note that individual bidders automatically
have a coalitions parameter of ui = 1. The truncation here also serves the purpose of ensuring
that the resulting density is bounded away from zero, with is necessary for the algorithm to
work. The ﬁrst six ﬁgures involve the situation presented below:
Characteristic Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Shape parameter (g) 0.5 1.0 2.5
Mean (µ) 2.5 2.5 2.5
k 1 1 1
u:
Figure 1 3 1 1
Figure 2 1 3 1
Figure 3 1 1 3
Figure 4 2 2 1
Figure 5 2 1 2
Figure 6 1 2 2
Because of the instability of the algorithm at the origin and the possible severe curvature of
the function li(t), numerical accuracy is essential. Therefore, key steps are taken to ensure
high numerical precision. In the solution, N, the number of grid points is chosen to be 10000.
Since the support of beliefs is the interval [1, 4], this means that the step size is 0.0003. All
the real variables needed to calculate lt(t) are declared in double precision, and all Taylor
series expansions are done up to the ﬁfth order. Finally, the convergence criterion is take to be
e = 10E −12. Experimentation with the algorithm clearly indicates that these criteria can be
signiﬁcantly relaxed at a low cost of accuracy.
The algorithm converges relatively fast. For a three type auction environment, the al-
gorithm converges in 2 minutes and 5 seconds on a 3GHz Pentium 4 laptop computer. The
maximum of the objective function in any of the following computations in this and the rest of
the paper is 4E −4. Despite the pathologies discussed in section 2, in practice the algorithm
9turns out to be remarkably stable. Indeed, once the condition that the density be bounded away
from zero is respected by the user, our experience is that the algorithm always produces sta-
ble and precise bid functions, even with quite extreme curvature of the distribution of private
values.
The ﬁrst three ﬁgures plot the equilibrium bid functions that result from environments
where one coalition of three individuals competes against two individuals of different types.
Inspection of the bid functions indicate that the coalition bids least aggressively. This is con-
sistent with the ﬁndings of Maskin and Riley (2000a) concerning the inverse relationship be-
tween the strength of the participant and aggression of its bid. However, their results were
derived in the case of two types. The computed bid functions here strongly suggest that this
result extends to cases where there are more than two types. Figures 4 to 6 explore the situa-
tion where there are two coalitions of two individuals each, bidding against a single individual.
The gap between the bid functions narrow relative to the ﬁrst three ﬁgures. This narrowing
is due to the fact that in these cases the bidders are more equally matched in terms of their
optimism, thus leading to more competition among them.
Figures 7 to 9 represent a different auction environment, given in the following table
Characteristic Type 1 Type 2 Type 3
Shape parameter (g) 0.5 1.0 2.5
Mean (µ) 2.5 2.5 2.5
u 1 1 1
k:
Figure 7 3 1 1
Figure 8 1 3 1
Figure 9 1 1 3
In these environments there are no collusive agreements (u1 = u2 = u3 = 1). However, unlike
the models of MMRS and Marshall and Schulenberg (1998), there is still asymmetry among
the bidders, due to the different values of the parameters indexing their distributions of pri-
vate values. The bid functions are close to each other in these cases because of the fact that
the parameters were chosen close to each other. These three graphs show the power of the
algorithm, in that we can now numerically study asymmetric auctions without assuming that
asymmetry comes from a subset of symmetric bidders deciding to collude.
Our ﬁnal example is one of particular interest. Welfare analysis of auction models such
as what is done in Maskin and Riley (2000a) assumes that the strong buyer’s valuation ﬁrst
order stochastically dominates that of the weak buyer. This example indicates what happens
when this condition is violated in a speciﬁc sense. In this example, there are 12 initial bid-
ders, 6 of type 1 , 4 of type 2, and 2 of type 3. The shape parameters of the private value
distributions for each type are: g1 = 2.0, g2 = 1.5, and g3 = 1.2. The corresponding means
are given by: µ1 = 1.063, µ2 = 1.174, µ3 = 1.317. We also have that bidders of the same type
collude. Inspection of ﬁgure (6) shows that the cdf of type 1 coalition starts out below those
of coalitions 2 and 3. But then it increases and eventually rises above those of its competitors
until the point v = 3 where they are all equal to 1. Interestingly, the bid functions exhibit very
similar pattern. Maskin and Riley (2000a) show in the case of two bidders that the stronger
10bidder shades his bids more than the weaker bidder. The stronger bidder is deﬁned as the
bidder whose valuation ﬁrst order stochastically dominates the other bidder. Figure (6) shows
that in comparing two bidders, if the ﬁst bidder’s valuation is ﬁrst stochastically dominated by
that of the second bidder, and then eventually dominates the valuation of the second bidder,
then the ﬁst bidder bids more aggressively in an interval at the lower end of the support, and
bids less aggressively in an interval at the upper end of the support. In short, the graph in (6)
indicates that when the distribution of private values cross once in the interior of their common
support, the corresponding equilibrium bid functions also cross (at most) once.
5 Second Price versus First Price Auctions
In this section, we employ the proposed algorithm to provide an insight into the revenue equiv-
alence between ﬁrst price and second price auctions when bidders are ex-ante asymmetric, and
when asymmetric bidders collude. Since the Dutch descending price auction is strategically
equivalent to the ﬁrst price auction, and under the assumption of private values, the English as-
cending price auction and the second price auction has the same optimal strategies, the results
of this analysis are also extended to comparison of Dutch and English auctions. First we study
the seller revenue and bidder surplus in a case where symmetric bidders collude. Then we
perform the analysis for the case where asymmetric bidders all compete. Finally, we perform
the same analysis for the case where symmetric subsets of the bidders collude. In the cases
of bidder collusion, the auction environment is characterized as follows. The membership of
the coalition is determined ex ante. The size of each coalition, as well as the types of each
coalition member is common knowledge within the coalition and to all other bidders. If the
coalition wins the item, the coalition member with the highest valuation is awarded the item.
Coalition members with values that are not the highest within the coalition do not submit a
bid at the main auction. Also, there are no side payments within the coalition. MMRS dis-
cusses the effects of relaxing the assumption that valuations are known within the coalition.
Their conclusion is that the ﬁrst price coalition calculations are as favorable as possible from
the point of view of the coalitions. Also they argue that the coalition is not disadvantaged at
the ﬁrst price auctions by not allowing for side payments among coalition members. Their
arguments and conclusions carry over in this study.
5.1 The Simulation Technique
Now that we have a method of computing equilibrium bid functions for general asymmetric
ﬁrst price auctions models, we can simulate expected seller revenue and bidder surplus for
comparison across ﬁrst and second price auctions. The technique is essentially the following.
First, private values are drawn randomly from the distributions for each coalition. Then the
corresponding equilibrium bids are computed for each coalition. With these in hand, the
winning bid is recorded as well as the identity of the winner along with its surplus and the
revenue to the auctioneer. This process is repeated NSIM times. The resulting average revenue
to the seller is the estimated expected revenue. Also, the average surplus of each coalition
divided by the number of individuals in the coalition is the estimated expected surplus to each
11bidder. There are two important issues that have to be addressed in this Monte Carlo study.
In reality, what the algorithm generates is the equilibrium bid for a grid of private values.
In the simulation, the random draw from the distribution of private values may not lie on
the pre-speciﬁed grid. Therefore, interpolation techniques have to be implemented in order
to attain approximate values of the equilibrium bid at points off the grid. For this we ﬁt
the data of bids to a high order orthogonal polynomial regression on private values. The
order of the polynomial used in the reported results is 15. This ensures very high numerical
accuracy. In fact, the square-root mean squared deviation of the predicted bid from the actual
bids is typically indistinguishable. This high level of accuracy is due the smoothness of the
bid functions.
In the simulation of expected revenue to the seller and expected proﬁts to the bidders,
the variance of these random variables are of the magnitude of the random variables them-
selves. Thus the raw simulation means and standard errors are of little use since the resulting
difference in the means are rarely statistically different from zero for reasonable simulation
numbers (up to 2 million). Increasing the simulation number solves this problem, but the
resulting computation time makes this solution unappealing. In this paper, our variance re-
duction strategy is to extensively employ the regression approach to linear control variates.
For completeness, a brief description of this technique presented.1 Consider the problem of
estimating the expectation of a random variable a = EY by Monte Carlo simulation, where Y
is a random variable that is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The natural point
estimate of a is the average ¯ Yn = n−1å
n
i=1Yi, computed from n draws from the distribution
of Y. Suppose the investigator has available a random vector C ∈ Âd with known mean µc
that is correlated with Y. The method consists of using ¯ Ci−µc to control for ¯ Yn via the linear
transformation:
¯ Yn(l) = ¯ Yn−l′ ¯ Ci−µc
 
, (5.1)
where l is a d ×1 vector chosen to minimize Var(¯ Yn(l)). Clearly the l that achieves this
minimum is the coefﬁcient (ˆ l) in the linear regression of {Yi}n
i=1 on {C′
i}n
i=1 and a constant.






YC is the usual coefﬁcient of determination from the regression ofY on C.
In the present paper, corresponding draws from the private value distribution for each
type F
uj
j j = 1,    ,r, as well as draws from the private value distribution when all n individ-
uals are of type j, Fn
j , j = 1,    ,r, provide an ‘efﬁcient’ set of control variates. This requires
that we have analytic or numeric means of these distributions. However, the mean of a two
parameter truncated Weibull distribution is easily computed numerically with very high preci-
sion. In particular, the computation of the means require a one dimensional integration, which
we perform using Gauss-Hermite quadrature with 40 abscissas.
1For a concise discussion of the various control variates techniques, see Szechtman (2003).
12In computing expected revenue in the asymmetric ﬁrst and second price auctions, the
reduction in variance from the control variates technique is striking. In all results presented,
we achieve reductions in variance from as low as 62% to as high as 91%. The reduction
in variance achieved in the calculation of expected bidder surplus is more modest, but still
quite signiﬁcant. We achieve reduction in variance from as low as 19% to as high as 69%. The
variance reduction technique here, along with clever choice of control variates results in all the
revenue comparisons and all the bidder surplus comparisons that follow be highly statistically
signiﬁcant.
5.2 Symmetric Bidders Colluding
Consider the auction environment where there are N = 5 potential bidders, each drawing val-
uations from the same truncated two parameter Weibull distribution. The shape parameter is
given by g=1.0 (thus an exponential distribution), and the mean of the distribution is 2.0. The
distribution is truncated between 0.5 (the reserve price) and 3.0.
TABLE 3
Auctioneer’s Expected Revenue and Bidders’ Expected Surplus (per capita) at a First and a
Second Price Auction (N=5, g = 1, µ = 2, Lower end point=0.5, Upper end point=3.0
First Price Second Price
k1 k2 u1 u2 Auct. k1 k2 Auct. k1 k2
1 1 4 1 1.4758 0.1572 0.2205 1.3941 0.2161 0.1022
(0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0013)
1 2 3 1 1.7078 0.1204 0.1394 1.6878 0.1561 0.1023
(0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0011)
1 3 2 1 1.8099 0.1064 0.1119 1.8069 0.1234 0.1023
(0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0009)
1 1 3 2 1.6545 0.1353 0.1483 1.6460 0.1560 0.1231
(0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0010)
2 1 2 1 1.7668 0.1171 0.1236 1.7654 0.1232 0.1024
(0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0017)
5 0 1 0 1.8498 0.1022 0.1022 1.8496 0.1022 0.1022
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Note. Computed by Monte Carlo using 1,000,000 drawings.
Table 3 reports the expected revenues and surpluses for ﬁrst and second price auctions. Note
that the bid functions in this analysis satisfy the (weak) ﬁrst order stochastic dominance con-
dition assumed by Maskin and Riley (2000a). Conditional on the size of the coalition, the
auctioneer’s expected revenue at the ﬁrst price auction is always greater than or equal to the
expected revenue at the second price auction. Similar results are found in MMRS where
their analysis is based on private values being drawn from the standard uniform distribution.
MMRS argue that this is evidence that ﬁrst the price auction is less susceptible to collusion
than the second price auction.
Maskin and Riley (2000a) also ﬁnds that the high bid (or ﬁrst price) auction generate
higher expected revenue than the open (or second price) auction under shifts and stretches the
13private value distribution. These transformations of the distributions result in a violation of
the assumption made in our analysis that all private value distributions have common support.
The evidence here suggests that the results found in MMRS and Maskin and Riley (2000a)
are not artifacts of the assumption that beliefs are drawn from uniform distribution. How-
ever, Maskin and Riley (2000a) ﬁnd that the open auction is superior to the high bid auction
when probability mass is shifted to the lower end point for one type. This transformation of
the private value distribution violates the assumption in this paper that the distributions are
twice-continuously differentiable everywhere on the interior of their common support. It also
violates their assumption that distributions are ordered in the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance
sense. We thus take this as evidence supporting the conjecture that the ﬁrst price auction is
superior to the second price auction whenever the distributions of private values satisfy the
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance property and are twice-continuously differentiable on the in-
terior of their supports. Table 3 also suggests that strong bidders prefer the second price (open)
auction and weak bidders prefer the ﬁrst price (high bid) auction. This result is also consistent
with Maskin and Riley (2000a).
We now compare the expected buyer surplus to gain some insight into the relative prof-
itability and susceptibility of collusion in ﬁrst and second price auctions. The simulation
results in Table 3 seem to support the conjecture that coalitions are more proﬁtable in second
price auctions that they are in ﬁrst price auctions. To see this we compare the ﬁrst three rows
of Table 3 where we ﬁnd that conditional on the size of the coalition, the expected surplus to
the coalition k1 is always greater in the second price auction that it is in the ﬁrst price auction.
Again, a similar conclusion is draw in MMRS.
The simulation results also shed light on another interesting related question. In the case
where all the bidders form separate coalitions, are the individuals in the larger coalition better
off than those in smaller coalitions? The results in Table 3 suggest that this is indeed the case
in ﬁrst price auctions, but not so for second price auctions. Looking at column 4 of Table 3, we
see that the per-capita surplus in the coalition of 3 bidders is higher than the per-capita surplus
in the coalition of 2 bidders in the second price auction, but lower in the ﬁrst price auction.
We now turn to the question of whether coalitions are sustainable in ﬁrst and second
price auctions. Our strategy is to check if it is individually rational for an existing coalition
to accept an outsider, and if it is individually rational for the outsider to join the coalition.
Comparing rows one to three of Table 3 (in reverse order) we see that in both the ﬁrst and
second price auctions, increasing the number of participants in the coalition increases the per-
capita expected surplus. For example, moving from row 3 to 2, we see that in the ﬁrst price
auction, increasing the number of participants from 2 to 3 increases the per-capita expected
surplus from 0.1064 to 0.1204. Thus it seems individually rational for existing coalitions to
accept an outsider. But is it the case that individual bidders will want to join the coalition?
Comparing the ﬁrst 3 rows of Table 3 from bottom up, we see that for the ﬁrst price
auction, the per-capita expected surplus is always higher outside the coalition than inside it.
Furthermore, as the size of the coalition increases, the remaining individual bidders do better
in terms of expected surplus, and the difference grows as the size of the coalition grows.
However, the individual bidders outside the coalition in the second price auction do just as
well regardless of the size of the coalition, and always do worse than individuals inside the
coalition. Thus the evidence suggests that as the size of the coalition grows, the remaining
14individual bidders are more likely to join the coalition. This suggests then that the second
price auction is susceptible to collusion and the ﬁrst price auction is not. Similar results are
found in MMRS.
5.3 Asymmetric Bidders Colluding
The conclusion drawn above that the ﬁrst price auction is superior to the second price auction
whenever the distributions of private values satisfy the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance prop-
erty and are twice-continuously differentiable on the interior of their supports leads us to our
next issue. Is the ﬁrst price auction still superior to the second price auction when we relax the
assumption of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance? To shed some light on this question, we sim-
ulate an asymmetric auction environment where there are N = 5 potential bidders partitioned
into 2 types characterized by different distributions of private values. The ﬁrst three bidders
draw valuations from a truncated two parameter Weibull distribution with shape parameter
given by g = 1.5, and the mean of the distribution is 1.0, where the truncation is between 0.5
and 3.0. The last two bidders draw valuations from the a truncated two parameter Weibull
distribution with shape parameter is given by g = 1.5, and the mean of the distribution is 3.0,
again where the truncation is between 0.5 and 3.0.
TABLE 4
Auctioneer’s Expected Revenue and Bidders’ Expected Surplus (per capita) at a First and a
Second Price Auction (N = 5, g = 1.5, µ1 = 1.0, µ2 = 3.0, Lower end point=0.5, Upper end
point=3.0)
First Price Second Price
k1 k2 u1 u2 Auct. k1 k2 Auct. k1 k2
3 2 1 1 1.7627 0.0449 0.1994 1.7552 0.0389 0.2140
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0010)
1 2 3 1 1.7219 0.0481 0.2165 1.7241 0.0491 0.2145
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0010)
1,1 2 2,1 1 1.7510 0.0458,0.0464 0.2044 1.7462 0.0433,0.0389 0.2144
(0.0002) (0.0012),(0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0012),(0.0017) (0.0010)
3 1 1 2 1.6393 0.0614 0.2231 1.5869 0.0388 0.2983
(0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0041) (0.0004) (0.0007)
Note. Computed by Monte Carlo using 1,000,000 drawings.
Row 2 of Table 4 sheds some light on this question. The bid functions in this environment
cross one at around 1.5 (Figure 9). What is remarkable is that this is the only setup in which
the expected revenue to the auctioneer is higher in the second price auction. The difference
is also statistically signiﬁcant. This result does suggest that in the case where ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance no longer holds, the ﬁrst price auction may no longer be superior to the
second price auction. In particular, in the case where the CDF’s cross once, leading to the
resulting bid functions crossing once, it may be the case that the second price (open) auction
is superior to the ﬁrst price (high bid) auction. This result is close to the result in proposition
4.5 of Maskin and Riley (2000a) where the weak bidder is characterized by some of the mass
of the distribution being shifted to the lower end point. As smoothed version of their setup
15would lead to the two cdf’s crossing once. Thus, according to our results, the bid functions
cross once. These results then suggest that whenever the bid functions cross once, the second
price auction may in some cases generate higher revenue to the auctioneer than the ﬁrst price
auction.
It is important to note that we are not claiming that if the bid functions cross then the
second price auction always generates higher expected revenue than the ﬁrst price auction.
The point of this exercise is to show that dominance of the ﬁrst price auction may simply
be an artifact of the assumption of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. To illustrate the point,
we present a case where the bid functions cross, but the ﬁrst price auction is still superior the
second price auction. In this environment, there are 4 bidders, 3 of type 1 and 1 of type 2. Type
one bidders draw private values from the truncated two parameter Weibull distribution with
mean 1.0 and shape parameter 2.0. Type two bidders draw private values from the truncated
two parameter Weibull distribution with mean 3.0 and shape parameter 1.5. The distributions
are truncated between 0.5 and 3.0. The resulting equilibrium bid functions along with their
corresponding private value distributions are presented in Figure 12. The key distinctions
between the function in Figure 11 and 12 are that the bid functions in Figure 12 cross further
to the left of the support and they deviate further apart. The simulated expected revenues in
this environment are 1.2999 for the ﬁrst price auction and 1.2984 for the second price auction.
Again these differences are statistically signiﬁcant. Thus this is an example where even though
the bid functions cross, the ﬁrst price auction is still superior to the second price auction in
terms of expected seller revenue.
6 Conclusion
We propose an algorithm for numerically solving ﬁrst price auction problems where bidders
draw independent valuations from heterogenous distributions and the auctioneer imposes a
reserve price for the object. The heterogeneity in this model arises both from the speciﬁcation
of ex-ante heterogenous, non-uniform distributions of private values for bidders, as well as
the possibility of subsets of these bidders colluding. We simulate the model under various
environments. The simulation results suggest that stronger bidders shade their bids more
in the asymmetric ﬁrst price auctions. The results also indicate that collusive activities are
more proﬁtable and sustainable in asymmetric second price auctions. We ﬁnd evidence that
under the assumption of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, the ﬁrst price auction generates
higher expected revenue to the seller. However, when the assumption of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance is relaxed, and the distributions of private values cross once, the evidence suggests
that the second price auction may in some cases generate higher expected revenue to the seller.
Possible extensions of the algorithm include, allowing for bidders of different types to
collude, extending the algorithm to heterogenous afﬁliated distributions, and allowing for risk
aversion in bidder preferences. The latter extension, though theoretically important will essen-
tially require an additional Taylor series expansion, to evaluate the chosen utility function. The
other extensions present a more formidable challenge of efﬁciently computing order statistics
from complex, convoluted joint distribution functions.
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17Figure 1: k1 = k2 = k3 = 1, u1 = 3, u2 = 1, u3 = 1














Figure 2: k1 = k2 = k3 = 1, u1 = 1, u2 = 3, u3 = 1














18Figure 3: k1 = k2 = k3 = 1, u1 = 1, u2 = 1, u3 = 3














Figure 4: k1 = k2 = k3 = 1, u1 = 2, u2 = 2, u3 = 1














19Figure 5: k1 = k2 = k3 = 1, u1 = 2, u2 = 1, u3 = 2














Figure 6: k1 = k2 = k3 = 1, u1 = 1, u2 = 2, u3 = 2














20Figure 7: u1 = u2 = u3 = 1, k1 = 3, k2 = 1, k3 = 1














Figure 8: u1 = u2 = u3 = 1, k1 = 1, k2 = 3, k3 = 1














21Figure 9: u1 = u2 = u3 = 1, k1 = 1, k2 = 1, k3 = 3














Figure 10: k1 = k2 = k3 = 1, u1 = 6, u2 = 4, u3 = 2


















22Figure 11: u1 = 3,u2 = 1, k1 = 1, k2 = 2











Figure 12: k1 = k2 = 1, u1 = 3, u2 = 1
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